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4Introduction
The purpose of a process plant control system is to maintain the plant in - or
transfer it to - a target state related to the overall operational goal.  If this func-
tion cannot be based on feedback or trial-and-error strategies, it is necessary to
identify the internal state of the system in a way which enables the controller to
plan its control actions in advance.  To identify system state means to label the
actual state of the system by a name which refers to one of a category of states or
events for which rules exist for determination of the appropriate actions.  Quite
naturally then, the categories used for identification depend upon the type of the
appropriate actions or, more basically, upon the current goal.  Typically, labels
are used which refer to the related actions (e.g. -"your water is now ready for tea"-
), to the state of typical variables (-"the temperature of the kettle is now 100 0 C"-)
or components (-"the water is boiling"-) and to different types of event.  Several
types of identification can typically be distinguished.  Sometimes, identification
serves to verify whether a known system state is present or not, generally in order
to decide whether the system is ready for an intended action. otherwise, identifi-
cation is used to confirm that an action has brought the system to the proper tar-
get state.  Another type of identification is needed in case of abnormal, unfore-
seen changes and faults in the system.  In this case, the identification implies a
determination of the actual internal anatomy and functioning of the system from
the observed behaviour.  This task is basically an inductive task.  In process
plant control it is, however, simplified by the fact that the plant generally will be
known to have functioned properly, and therefore the identification can result
from a search to locate a change with reference to knowledge of the normal state.
The term diagnosis used for this kind of identification is in some respect mis-
leading.  The general meaning of diagnosis is the determination of the cause of
some observed symptoms, but this is not necessarily the case in our context.  The
ultimate purpose of diagnosis in process plant control is to link the observed
symptoms to the actions which will serve the current goal properly.  This can be
done in several different ways, see fig. 1. In some cases this can be done directly;
in other cases a sequence of data transformations is used to create the link, but
even then it depends upon the conditions of the specific occurrence as to whether
determination of the cause is needed.  The strategies and data processes used by
the controller to perform the task primarily depend upon two conditions: the cur-
rent goal and the kind of a priori knowledge available to the controller.
5Fig. 1. System state identification diagnosis is an integral part of the sequence of subtasks leading
to operator actions.  In some cases of rational, causal reasoning, diagnosis is a separate subtask;
in other cases of stereotyped responses, a diagnostic task cannot be separated.
The Task Sequence
The dependence of diagnostic strategies upon the current goal and the type of a
priori knowledge imply that the diagnostic task cannot be considered in isolation
but should be studied as a part of the total task sequence.
The rational sequence of operations in the task to be performed by a controller in
response to an accidental change in the operating conditions of a plant is the fol-
lowing:
1. Detect the advent of a change in the system.
2. Identify the actual state of the system in terms of the functional aspects of
the change.
3. Interpret the state of the system to predict the operational consequences of
the change.
64. Evaluate the current goal and determine the target state into which the
system should be transferred in order to comply with the goal.
5. Find the changes in the present operational conditions which will bring the
system into the target state.
6. Plan the sequence of actions and locate the proper means of manipulations.
7. Execute.
This rational sequence of operations is necessary in case of new, unfamiliar
situations when the control action must be based on causal, functional evalua-
tion of the situation.  In absence of specific plant experience, each step is logically
necessary.
The content of the diagnostic task depends upon the specific occasion: if the
pressure of a tank or the temperature of a furnace is rapidly rising, the situation
typically signals danger, and the immediate goal will be to protect the equipment
from damage, presumably by release of some predetermined safety action, e.g.
automatic shutdowns In this case, the diagnostic task is a search to locate the
change in terms of the state of some critical variables without losing time by
searching for the cause of the observed state.
In less dramatic situations the control goal may be to compensate for the effect
upon critical variables from the initial change or fault, for instance to avoid dras-
tic automatic safety actions.  In this case, the diagnostic task will be to locate the
critical variables and to find possible means for counter-actions from the causal
or functional flow structure of the system.  This can also be done without consid-
eration of the primary cause of the situation.  Finally, if the goal of the controller
is to restore the normal condition prior to the change, the aim of the diagnosis is
to locate the affected component topographically in order to be able to adjust or
repair it.
To sum up, the diagnostic task in process plant control will be a search to locate
a change in the operating condition of the plant, but - depending upon the cir-
cumstances - the target will be related to endangered critical variables, affected
causal flow paths, or faulty equipment and components.  Apart from this depend-
ence upon the aim of the diagnosis, the strategy used to perform it will depend
strongly upon the a priori knowledge of plant properties, i.e. the data processing
model, available to the controller.
7Critical Variables and Causal Flow Paths in Process Plant
Two typical aspects of diagnosis or identification in industrial process plants are
the relations to critical variables and causal flow paths.
In the present context, critical variables are defined as the state variables of the
system which are subject to specified constraints or limit values in order to en-
sure safe or reliable operation.  The critical variables must be chosen as targets
for causal paths which connect them to control actions in order to counteract the
primary change or cause of improper operation.  In energy and mass balance
systems, the critical variables are basically related to the level of accumulation or
"pile up" of the system, representing the stress imposed on the barriers retaining
the stored energy or matter.  Other critical variables can be related to the actual
state or condition of energy containments or barriers (temperature of bearings,
stress in tank walls, vibration of structures).
Causal paths are the paths along which events and changes propagate through
the structure of the system.  A causal path is a chain of directed relations defin-
ing the relationships between state variables.  Basically, causality is a conse-
quence of the laws of energy and mass conservation, and causal paths can be
seen as connected to a flow of matter or energy through the system.  In practice,
we must also consider causal paths related to the flow of information, e.g. in the
control system, which influence the flow conditions of energy and matter flow
systems. (Viewing a control system as an energy flow system is unhelpful in most
cases related to its function at system level).
Two classes of matter and energy flow systems are important in the present con-
text:
Mass or eneray balance systems in which the input and output flows can be
controlled rather independently and which in consequence include a storage fa-
cility.  In such systems there is a danger of a flow balance being disturbed so that
variables related to storage level reach critical limits before intrinsic feedback ef-
fects limit input flow. (I.e. the system is fed from a flow - e.g. current - source).
Balance systems are typically parts of the main process paths of a plant, and
since matter is normally the transport medium for energy, such balance systems
overlap and are interconnected in a complex structure, see fig. 2.
In mass and energy transport systems flow is only controlled from the system
output terminal, as is the case for supply systems.  Intrinsic feedback effects ad-
just system input flow to match output demand without significant change of
level variables (the system is connected to a "flow potential" - e.g. voltage source).
Transport systems typically supply necessary operating conditions for the main
8processes, and are connected to these and influence them at many nodes in the
plant structure.
Information flow systems, typically instrumentation and control systems, inter-
connect the different causal paths related to flow of energy and matter.  Informa-
tion flow systems introduce feedback paths in the physical processes and change
the basic causal structure and relations, often drastically.
Transport systems - supply as well as information systems control the operating
conditions of the energy and mass balance systems, and the critical variables in
transport systems are those output variables which represent the coupling to the
energy flow of the main process.  Supply and information systems generally have
highly branched structures affecting the causal paths of the main processes of
the plant at many points.  Changes or faults in supply or control systems there-
fore obscure the causal structure of the total system considerably.
Energy and mass balance systems have a special significance in process plant di-
agnosis.  First of all, the potential for major hazards is connected to loss of con-
trol of major energy or mass (poison) accumulations.  However, the laws of con-
servation of energy and matter provide invariant structures to guide diagnosis
which information systems do not have, and the integrating relation between an
initial fault affecting a flow and the resulting dangerous level of a balance intro-
duce the time delay which generally makes counteraction to restore equilibrium
physically possible.
Fig. 2. Map illustrating the complexity of a power plant viewed as a system of overlapping causal
flow structures.
9Fig. 3. Transport or balance system? - Depends upon circumstances.
Diagnostic Strategies in Supervisory Control
The diagnostic task implied in supervisory control is in general a search to iden-
tify a change from normal or planned plant operation in terms which refer the
controller to the appropriate actions.  The search can be performed in different
ways, depending upon the controller's intention or goal which very likely will
change during the task. (The controller can in this context be a man and/or a
machine).
Following the detection of accidental maloperation for instance by a warning sig-
nal, the immediate intention can be to ensure that no major hazard is present.  A
preselected set of critical variables is scanned to test whether a data pattern re-
lated to preplanned safety action e.g. plant shut-down is observed.  This se-
quence can be performed by an operator, but is also in fact the function behind
an automatic safety system.  If no immediate danger is present, the subsequent
intention may be to compensate the effect of the change either to restore normal
production or anticipate automatic protective actions.  In this case the function
can be based on a feedback control loop, or the action must be based on an iden-
tification from a search which is performed in cause and effect relationships.  Ul-
timately, the intention will be to judge the need for repair, and a search in terms
of parts and components will be needed.
Depending upon the specific situation and the immediate intention of the con-
troller, the search can be performed in two different ways.  It can take the form of
a search through a library of data sets or state models related to different abnor-
mal system states stored in the controller to find the one that matches the ob-
served data pattern.
On the other hand, the search can be performed by a search in the actual oper-
ating system to locate the change in terms of causal relations or parts and com-
10
ponents, with reference to a model of normal or planned operation which is stored
in the controller.
Before the overall search strategies are discussed, the different elementary search
routines will be discussed in more detail.
Fig. 4. Schematic information flow graph of topographic strategy.
Elementary Diagnostic Search Routines
Broadly speaking, the two different search routines discussed above can be
termed symptomatic and topographic search procedures.  Every observation ren-
ders information identifying the information source and the content of its mes-
sage.  By symptomatic search, reference to the identity of system state is obtained
from the information content of the observations; by topographic search, refer-
ence is obtained from the location of the information source, while the results of
good/bad judgements of the information content are used to control the strategy.
11
Fig. 5. Schematic information flow graphs of symptomatic strategies.
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Topographic search locates a change or fault with reference to a model of normal
or planned system performance and is based on good/bad judgements of obser-
vations.
Variables measured or observed in the system can be judged individually against
stored norm or reference data.  In this case the reference model will generally be a
flow map of the system supplying reference data related to variables along flow
paths.  The detailed search decisions will be like this: if observation is judged
good, seek down stream; if not, seek up stream.  The change is supposed to be
between a good and a bad observation.  This search is advantageous since search
decisions are simple and can be related to observations individually.  Low buffer
memory capacity is needed, and hierarchical search strategies can easily be im-
plemented (half split search).  However, difficulties are often found in practice; the
causal direction in a flow path is frequently ambiguous by nature or disturbed by
feedback loops.  Furthermore, the system must be in an operational state corre-
sponding quantitatively to the state for which reference models are available.
Superior to this simple linear search are strategies which judge relationships in
sets of observations.  If boundaries can be found around system parts or func-
tions for which the input-output relations are subject to known laws and rela-
tions - such as mass and energy balance constraints - reference to location of the
change inside or outside the boundaries is obtained by good/bad judgement of
data sets related to boundary conditions.  This search is advantageous, since it
takes feedback properties more readily into account and is more independent of
the quantitative level of operation (at least in linear systems).  This is because
judgements are performed on data relations representing system properties
rather than on the magnitude of data representing system states.  It demands,
however, more complex data processing for judgements and more complex search
strategies.
An important feature of topographic search is the dependence upon a model of
normal or intended plant operation.  This model can be derived from the system
designer's a priori information and stored in the controller (by training an opera-
tor or programming a computer), or it can be derived by the controller "on-line" if
the different intended or normal operational regimes (shut-down, starting up,
normal operation, etc.) can be defined and distinguished by the controller.  The
efficiency of the topographic search may be increased considerably if special op-
erating states and corresponding references are introduced artificially as is the
case in preplanned test procedures.  Then a sequence of operating states which
are especially sensitive to specific faults can be used as test conditions.
Topographic search sequences based on good/bad judgements use the informa-
tion content of the observations rather inefficiently, and consequently rather long
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sequences of judgements may be needed to obtain a precise identification of a
fault or change.  The ultimate identification will be in terms of the location in a
map representing system anatomy which may be structured in terms of system
functions or in terms of parts and components.
Symptomatic search procedures obtain the reference to the identity of system
state from the information content of the observations.  In principle a search is
made through a library of data patterns representing abnormal system states
which are compared with the observed data pattern until a match is obtained.
The reference sets can be generated empirically from system operation or derived
by analysis or simulation of the response of the system to postulated faults or
changes in operating conditions.  Furthermore, the reference pattern can be gen-
erated on-line if the controller has a functional model available which can be up-
dated according to the current hypothesis.
When the search is performed in the data domain by a search through a stored
library, the reference patterns can be labelled in terms either of the initial cause,
of the predicted effect, or of the appropriate action to take by the controller.  De-
pending upon the structure of the controller, the search can be a sequential deci-
sion table look up or a recognition by an associative network.  The reference sets
can be related to specific operational states, but also more general templates can
be used to further the search.  Specific data patterns can refer to faults in a type
of component or function, the patterns being given in terms of their failure prop-
erties - e.g. instability, noise characteristics, time constants.
Symptomatic search supported by a ready-made library of reference patterns is a
search by pattern recognition.
If the search is based on reference patterns generated on-line by modification of a
functional model in correspondence with a postulated fault, the search procedure
may be termed "hypothesis and test".  The efficiency of this search depends upon
the strategy used to generate hypothesis.  Typically, hypothesis generation will be
guided by topographic identification at a rather general level combined with fuzzy
recognition and consideration of the frequency of previously experienced faults.
Symptomatic search is advantageous from the point of view of information econ-
omy, and a precise identification can frequently be obtained in a single step or
decision, which on the other hand implies a complex data process.  One serious
limitation is that a reference model of the actual abnormal state of operation
must be available.  This means that reference sets must be predicted by analysis
or recorded by prior occurrences.  Or, the reference set must be generated on-line
using a model which can be adjusted on occasion to simulate the abnormal op-
eration - which may be outside the normal (linear) operating range.
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Data Processing Demands from Elementary Strategies
The different elementary diagnostic strategies imply different data processes
based on several kinds of data processing models of plant functions or states.
Likewise, the demand for data processing and memory capacity vary widely.  In
the following sections some of these aspects are discussed in more detail.
Topographic Search
The characteristics of topographic search along a flow path can be fitted well to
the characteristics of human data processing.  Observations and instrument
readings can be treated individually, and the simple good/bad results of judge-
ments do not create too much memory strain.  The precondition is however that a
reference model is available with data compatible with observations for immediate
judgement and with clear indications of directed flow paths to control the search
strategy.  If the operator is not presented with external support in the form of the
necessary reference model, he will be left with a complex mental task.  Unless he
remembers the quantitative reference data, he will have to deduce them from a
functional model of the system.  Functional models at several levels may be in-
volved (Rasmussen 1977).  The flow structure model may be deduced from a
higher level intentional model of the system, whereas reference data must be de-
duced from a lower level model of detailed physical processes.  Support informa-
tion can be presented to the operator in the form of graphic flow diagrams or
drawings (fig. 6) with reference data.  However, the computer offers the possibility
of collecting and storing reference data, comparing the actual data, and present-
ing the deviation from normal state in an integrated display separating the differ-
ent causal flow systems.  Direct visual identification of the location of the change
in the flow system can then be performed.
The advantage of topographic search by judgement of component characteristics
represented by the relationships in data sets rather than directly of quantitative
magnitudes of data has been mentioned.  In this kind of search which implies
more complex data processing, the computer clearly offers advantages.  A se-
quential narrowing down of the boundaries of the field (i.e. the extension of plant
functions) for which input-output relations and balances are examined can lead
to an automatic, hierarchical identification of the location of the fault although
possibly not to the detail needed.  However, the result can then be used for effi-
cient selection of the content and format of displays to support operator judge-
ments.  The speed and capacity of low cost computers available now suggest a
more careful consideration of dynamic, on-line state identification for advanced
good/bad test of functions, e.g. the use of Kalmann filters or "observers" to check
energy balances in non-stationary operational states.
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Search by judgements of relations can be very efficient by computers - human
operators are not suited for calculating and testing of relations, unless correct-
ness of relations can be judged visually by special displays which are inherently
insensitive to absolute magnitudes or use normalized data (fig. 7).
Topographic search depends on reference models representing intended or nor-
mal system operation.  Data can be collected on-line by computers, statistically
processed and structured into such reference models if the proper operating re-
gimes can be adequately identified.
Topographic search can be performed by means of a sequence of tests.  Gener-
ally, a reference model is chosen which corresponds to a normal operating state
of the system.  A more efficient search can be obtained, however, if the system
can be forced through a sequence of test states which affect different parts of the
system in carefully selected combinations and for which reference models can be
prepared.  Administration and evaluation of such tests depend on logical combi-
natorial arguments calling for efficient short term memory, and should be auto-
mated or the operator should be assisted by an efficient computer book-keeping
and display algorithm, as e.g. suggested by Furth et al. (fig. 8).
Topographic search has many elements and subtasks which are eminently suited
for computer automation because they are based on causal deductions and logi-
cal decisions related to a small set of operating regimes which are chosen by the
designer and for which the necessary reference data can be obtained by prior
analysis or on-line simulation or data collection.
Traditionally, the information measured in a process plant is supplied to control-
lers as individual quantities representing physical variables.  To support an effi-
cient search in diagnostic tasks, however, the measured information should be
combined and transformed to consistent sets of data describing the state in the
different causal flow systems.  This means that the individual measured data will
be used to derive different variables in different overlapping flow structures.
Furthermore, computers can readily derive valid reference data for good/bad
judgements from statistical processing of measured data.
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Fig. 7. Displays designed to support operators in the task of good/bad judgements of relations
between variables.
Fig. 8. Computer generated display designed to assist operators in administration of diagnostic
test sequences.  Elimination of component or function resulting from a test is indicated by hori-
zontal lines.  From Furth et al., 1967.
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Automated Topographic Search
Computers are also well suited for storage of information on plant properties in
terms of causal flow structures together with rules and relations defining the pos-
sible interrelationships between state variables.  The computer can deduce refer-
ence data and generate normal state models in different domains and configura-
tions and automatically perform a good/bad mapping of the system.  As long as
effective reference states or operational regimes can be identified and properly
defined in a specific abnormal situation, a rather close location of abnormalities
can, in principle, be obtained without considering the cause, i.e., whether multi-
ple causes are present etc., and without considering the control intention or the
overall goal which is necessary for deciding upon the control action.  An appro-
priate plan for the man-machine cooperation at this stage of the discussion
seems to be a scheme where the computer performs a hierarchical and sequential
narrowing down of the field of attention in a causal domain to the degree of detail
which can be obtained, when only information known to be reliable and valid is
used.  A graphic presentation of the causal flow structure of the system indicating
the state of the disturbed or abnormal flow together with the boundaries within
which the source of disturbance has been located, can be a trustworthy support
to an operator, who then will have to label the situation in terms of cause, effect,
or action to take.  The difficult task of structuring and identifying a complex
situation which cannot be foreseen by a designer is then left to the man who has
the possibility of making an optimal decision.  The important aspect in this ap-
proach is the fact that the automatic computer analysis can be based on analysis
of a set of known and well specified plant operating states and after a sequence of
stepwise narrowing of the boundaries around the possible location of the distur-
bance, the analysis can be terminated when the data or references become un-
certain.
The topographic search strategies have the advantage of being universal in many
ways.  They are related to a general type of plant description, the causal flow
map, and are not in their strategic algorithms dependent upon the information
describing the actual plant state, only upon result of good/bad judgements.
More effort can be justified in development of universal algorithms which are not
tied to specific plant types or states.
Symptomatic Search
As we have seen, symptomatic search strategies depend upon reference models
representing various specific, abnormal, or unintended plant states.  Below we
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distinguish the following practical search strategies: Recognition, decision table,
hypothesis and test.
Recognition is typically used in familiar situations by human controllers to iden-
tify the state of the control object.  Direct recognition by perception and associa-
tive labelling is only possible if the relevant information is presented simultane-
ously in parallel - and formatted in proper patterns or structures.  Even then rec-
ognition will be biased strongly by expectations and "process-feel", and the pat-
tern should be sensitive to changes in all necessary conditions (defining attrib-
utes) of the situation and the format must fit population stereotypes for recogni-
tion.  The computer has been used to compose visual, graphic displays (Chernoff
1971, Coekin 1969) but also composite computer controlled auditive displays
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should be investigated, e.g. to keep the operator's dynamic world model - expec-
tations properly updated.
System states can be perceived directly in terms of functional system condition,
in terms of cause, effect, or in terms of the appropriate action - depending upon
the immediate intention of the operator.  Apart from such specific recognitions,
the human operator has a capability for fuzzy recognition referring to more gen-
eral concepts as types or classes of events or states.  Such recognitions can be
related to secondary sources of information such as noise, instabilities, non-
linearities etc.  The possibility of fuzzy recognitions should be considered carefully
since they can be an important source of bright ideas in search by hypothesis
and test.
If information is not available in parallel as an integrated set or picture, but must
be collected from separate sources sequentially, recognition by a human operator
is no longer a process depending upon perception, but rather a sequential cogni-
tive process depending upon short term memory capacity and logical reasoning.
This process is unreliable due to a tendency to adopt strategies which protect the
memory from overload by judging observations individually.  Thus complex re-
sponses due to one single cause will very likely be ascribed the effect of coincident
simple causes.  A tendency to base recognitions on characteristic signs or cues
rather than on the complete, necessary or defining pattern leads to the same ef-
fect.
Search by decision table look-up- depends upon a library of reference models re-
lated to specific abnormal plant states.  The output from the search can be la-
belled in functional state, cause, effect, or appropriate action; however, care
should be taken in the formulation of the output.  If action is required according
to the result of the search - which will be the case when the matching set defines
a dangerous plant state - such action should be performed automatically by a
safety system or the message should be formulated as a direct order to an opera-
tor with the system designer taking responsibility for correctness.  If the operator
is considered responsible, the result of the search should be presented as a hy-
pothesis and labelled in concepts related to the domain for which the operator
has facilities to perform a test, e.g. in cause or functional state.  Even then, the
probability of correctness must be high and not only in trivial cases.  Therefore,
the search should be hierarchically organized and not pursued to more detail
than that for which correctness and completeness can be maintained.  The li-
brary of,abnormal instances will only cover occurrences which are known from
experience and analysis, and major problems in this kind of search strategy can
be caused by multiple failure situations.
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Digital computers are well suited to perform a plant disturbance analysis by deci-
sion table based algorithms, especially if the number and locations of measure-
ments in the plant are carefully chosen to secure high resolution of the search
(Bevenblut and Whitehouse 1977).
In search by hypothesis and test the reference model representing a hypothetical
abnormal plant state is deduced on demand.  A functional model representing
normal plant anatomy and function is modified according to the hypothesis, and
the corresponding hypothetical plant response pattern is deduced by means of
the model and compared with the observed set.  This is a complex data process
with high demand for processing and memory capacity and will only be possible
for operators if they are supported very effectively by external means.  If this is
not the case, they would very probably chose to test the hypothesis by manipula-
tion of the system - i.e. they would probably modify the system to fit their model
rather than vice versa.
Functional Models for Hypothesis Testing
Test of a hypothesis by generating a test data pattern from a model of the specific
abnormal system state leads to several important constraints on the functional
model used.  To discuss such constraints, it is necessary to review the charac-
teristics of different types of functional models, as they have been described else-
where (Rasmussen 1977).
The functional models represent system properties in terms of rules or laws inter-
relating the individual state variables.  This can refer to different levels of ab-
straction.  The rules can be related to the detailed physical - i.e. mechanical,
chemical, or electrical - process and connect physical (measurable) variables.
This level of modelling will often be needed to generate or modify state data used
as references.  At a higher level of abstraction, rules can be related to causal
paths describing flow of mass, energy, and information.  The rules and variables
are more general - system independent - and feasible for describing overall plant
relations independent of specific hardware detail.  Finally, functional properties
may be represented in terms of the effect or purpose in relation to the environ-
ment, an intentional representation which relates to states and rules given by the
environment.
Apart from these categories, another distinction is important.  A functional model
can be structured as a network of relations interconnecting variables, and it can
be structured as a set of objects or functions which are ascribed properties and
potential for action.  The latter is typical of human verbal reasoning.  In this case
system variables are represented by collective data as actions, events, and states;
and functional rules as properties of interacting objects or functions.  System be-
haviour is predicted by a linear sequence of complex, qualitative cause-effect ar-
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guments.  By contrast, a model structured in variables and relations is a network
of rules connecting quantitative data, and only a data processor having high
memory capacity and speed can use this representation efficiently.
An efficient test of a hypothesis can be obtained if a computer is used to generate
a quantitative test pattern from a model structured in variables and relations.  To
use a computer this way to test hypothesis generated by an operator may lead to
interface problems.  The change to be introduced in the functional model of the
computer will be a readjustment of a set of parameters which probably will not be
compatible with the concepts used to express hypothesis by an operator, who
thinks in terms of components, events, and intentions.  Therefore, a translation
between expressions based on objects/events and variables/relations will be
needed with the purpose to let the computer accept hypothesis expressed in
natural language, and to display its operations and results in a way which allows
the operator to judge the conditions and factual content of the performance of the
computer.
Translation of hypothesis generated by human operators to changes in a com-
puter model will be simplified if the computer operates from an object based
cause-and-effect model.  This kind of model has - and for the same reason - been
developed for qualitative accident analysis (Nielsen 1974) and has been suggested
for on-line disturbance analysis (Dahll 1976, Taylor 1977).
To a great extent, present systems are performing "alarm analysis", i.e. the input
information is discretized state information, which is used as signs of more com-
plex states of functions or components.  Then, the price of better compatibility to
operator's language is simplicity and inaccuracy of the model, which can be criti-
cal in complex situations.
Overall Diagnostic Strategies
In the design of an efficient overall diagnostic strategy, several aspects must be
considered, which can only be evaluated with reference to detailed descriptions of
real life work situations.  The following considerations are intended to illustrate
the elements of the analysis which are needed before the above elementary diag-
nostic strategies can be put into the proper context.
The changing goal behind the diagnostic task has been mentioned.  The domain
in which the result of the diagnostic search should emerge depends upon the goal
or intention of the diagnostician.  Intention to judge system safety and the need
for preplanned safety actions is related to identification in terms of endangered
critical variables in the data domain; intention to find counteractions in order to
avoid automatic safety actions is related to identification in the functional do-
main; and intention to remove the cause of abnormality is related to identification
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in the domain of physical components.  In this way, the intention may be subject
to change in the course of events, and the ability to transfer results of diagnostic
searches among the different domains of representation is important for an effi-
cient diagnostician, be it a man or a machine.
The complexity of industrial process systems, the effect of which is increased in
diagnostic situations by the possibility of multiple faults due to coincident causes
or consequent failures, often creates a need to structure the search as a sequen-
tial lizooming in" through several levels of detail in the field of attention.  The
switching of level of detail during diagnosis will often be coupled to a need for a
change in descriptive domain, as discussed above.  The domain which will be
chosen for the search in practical situations will very probably not be guided
solely by the domain in which the result is needed.  If the result can be easily
transferred between the different descriptive domains, the search will typically be
performed in the domain for which the most efficient strategy is available.
The performance criterion which can be used to judge the efficiency of a diagnos-
tic strategy depends upon the limitations which constrain the data processing in
a given situation.  The efficiency depends upon a multidimensional fit between
demand and processing capacity which will vary in several aspects.
In general, a data processing system will be a multidimensional demand/resource
system.  The flexibility of such a system very often makes it possible to solve a
demand/resource conflict along one of the dimensions by a change in strategy or
type of process.
Some dimensions of the resources in data processing typically are:
- the time allowed for the task;
- the amount of input information available or the cost of
observations;
- the a priori information on system structure and function or useful analo-
gies (models);
- the capacity of short term memory;
- the capacity of the data processor;
- the code, level of abstraction, used in processing;
- the repertoire of ready-made-solutions;
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- the risk, the cost of mistakes.
Demand/resource conflicts in one dimension can be solved by spare capacity in
another: Lack of input information can be compensated by use of a more complex
model; capacity problems by recoding and "chunking" information to a higher
level of abstraction etc.
When planning diagnostic strategies based on man-computer cooperation, it is
important to consider the need for the operator to switch between strategies to
cope with demand/resource conflicts in real life situations.  This aspect may lead
to a need for the operator to be able to order a computer to switch strategy with
full transfer of intermediate results to match the immediate limitations of the op-
erator's data processing capacity.  In passing, it may be noticed that not only
should the operator then have the information necessary for the strategy in cur-
rent use, but he may also need information to judge the efficiency of alternative
strategies.
The influence of attitudinal factors is closely connected to this question of alter-
native strategies.  Studies of operator's accept of computer assistance repeatedly
emphasize the importance of the fact that operators must understand the strate-
gies used by the computer and be able to predict its responses in order to gain
confidence (Halpin et al. 1973).
Constraints Due to Reliability and Safety
The overall reliability of a diagnostic system is of course of prime importance.  In
a previously published discussion (Rasmussen and Taylor 1976) of problems re-
lated to prediction of human reliability, it has been suggested that analysability
for risk must be considered to be a vital design criterion in process systems.  In
essence, the conclusions of this discussion were the following:
Human reliability: Necessary conditions for the use of probabilistic methods to
predict the probability that a specified task is performed satisfactorily are:
- there is no significant contribution from systematic errors due to improper acti-
vation of operator's intentions, interference from other tasks or activities, etc.;
and
- the task can be broken down to a sequence of independent subtasks at a level
where failure data can be obtained from similar work situations;
and
- the subtasks are cued individually by the system or by other external means, so
that modification of procedure does not take place;
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or
- if task cannot be broken down to independent subtasks, but is performed as
one integrated whole or it is based on higher cognitive functions, then the effect of
the task must be reversible and surveyed by a predictable monitoring, testing or
inspecting function.
In the present context, these conditions represent aspects, which must be con-
sidered when planning an interactive diagnostic system of predictable perform-
ance.  Important considerations are real life goal structures or intentions; the
chance of competing tasks; proper cueing of subroutines, etc.  As diagnostic
tasks are considered to be complex tasks, improvement of reliability by feed back
in terms of facilities for test of the effect of intended actions before execution
would be desirable.
The ultimate goal of a diagnostic effort is an action upon the system, typically in
abnormal situations and therefore typically in the form of non-routine actions.  In
this situation, the probability of unsafe human acts is important.
In general, the probability of specific, extraneous human acts caused by sporadic
errors cannot be quantified.  Such acts, however, can be important contributors
to rare chains of events leading to accidents.
Therefore, the probability of specific, abnormal events can only be quantified - i.e.
related to empirical data if:
- it can be demonstrated that sporadic human acts are not significant contrib-
uters to the probability; if necessary by introduction of interlocks or barriers
which prevent human interaction;
or
- the effects of human acts are reversible and detectable by a monitoring or safety
function which can be performed by operators or automatically, and for which the
reliability can be analysed.
In other words, this means that to be able to analyse and predict risk systemati-
cally in high consequence/low probability situations, it is necessary to aim at a
design which does not bring operators in irreversible act situations.  This crite-
rion leads to a "policy of shared responsibility".  The designer takes responsibility
for system safety.  Protective actions are then either automated or demanded of
operators through clear orders based on automatic diagnosis; whereas the op-
erator's responsibility will be to maintain production through timely counter-
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action to prevent excessive safety measures and by adequate testing and mainte-
nance.
Redundancy and diversLLZ are important means for improvement of system reli-
ability.  In this respect it should be noted that the different diagnostic strategies
use different aspects of the information content in observations and depend upon
different kinds of models and processes.  Therefore, use of the strategies for mu-
tual test and verification can introduce the effects of redundancy in the diagnostic
process.
Concluding Remarks
The preceding discussion has touched upon several isolated aspects of the diag-
nostic task in control room environments.  To discuss these aspects in the con-
tent of the work situations of real life and to judge the possibility for efficient
computer support of operators, a detailed analysis of a number of reference
situations is necessary.  Such analysis must lead to realistic scenarios which can
serve as basis for evaluation of overall strategies and for planning of simulator
experiments.  Such work is currently in progress as a part of a joint Scandinavian
project.
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